Dealing with Islamism has been a major problem in the Arab politics. Islamism has presented the strongest challenge to the authority, performance, and power of the Arab States causing political instability in the region and skepticism in the world (particularly, the West). Ignoring Islamism is not an option and suppressing it no longer feasible. While Islamist groups exist in all forms: radical or moderate, violent or non-violent, traditional or modernist, democratic or authoritarian, it is only the challenge presented by moderate Islamist groups that is in discussion here.[1] These mainstream moderate Islamist groups operate peacefully within national boundaries, and seek to influence the politics of their societies by working within the system.[2] Before attempting to propose a solution, a brief explanation of the causes of the popularity of Islamism is necessary. Key historical events, such as the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Iranian Revolution and the Hostage crisis, created disdain for the nationalistic endeavors and a demand for Islamism as an alternative ideology.[3] While these events explain the growth of Islamism, the root cause of its inception is the failing and illegitimate authoritarian rule in various Arab states. Where the authoritarian state delivers, protest is rare. But for many reasons, that have nothing to do with Islamism, such as falling oil prices, rapidly expanding populations that inhibit economic growth and unwillingness to open up markets, the authoritarian regimes have ceased to be efficient. [4] Paradoxically, by eliminating secular opposition movements and parties, these regimes created a political and intellectual space that Islamism quickly occupied. Even the most repressive Arab state cannot control opposition expressed through the religious idiom.[5] Due to these reasons, Islamism’s influence rose in Arab politics and continues challenge the authority of the Arab States, causing political instability through opposition movements. An analysis of the causes behind Islamism’s popularity provides the foundation through which Arab states can meet the challenge of Islamism. Islamism thrives on the weakness and inability of the current governments. Islamist groups particularly engage in activities such as community service to provide the people what they don’t get from the governments and therefore, appear as a better option compared to nationalist governments. In order to counter its challenge, Arab states will have to take measure that will undercut the popularity of Islamist groups and will win some goodwill of the public. Countering the demand of Islamist groups and ideology will require certain systemic changes and some grass-root level cultural changes. The first step in undercutting the popular support of Islamist groups through system reform is testing their adherence to the principles they advocate. The only way this is possible is if moderate Islamist groups are allowed to directly participate in politics. The suppression of opposition parties and movements created the vacuum, which Islamism has moved into. In the past, three Islamic state models – Iran, Sudan, and Taliban’s Afghanistan – have all failed dramatically, revealing the inability of Islamists to run effective and moderate governments. [6] Just like Islamism thrives on the weakness of the state governments, state governments would benefit if the weakness of Islamism as a political alternative is exposed, thus reducing the challenge it presents to its authority. Giving political voice to Islamist groups might seem like a risky endeavor, however, it seems less so when the effect that election campaigns have on Islamist groups is taken into account. The decision to participate in elections divides Islamist groups into radicals and moderates. Radical Islamists defy state-dominated elections and believe them to be meaningless and manipulated. Moderates, who consistently bring a majority with them, push for a gradualist approach and “seize on the legitimacy” derived from competition. Given this, the state’s decision to exclude Islamists from election, ironically, ends up solidifying the radical Islamist movements and weakening the beneficial moderate ones. For those who believe that once in office, Islamists would adopt radical postures on Islamic issues (possibly to embarrass the government), history has provided examples that puts such claims to rest. “The examples in Jordon, Kuwait, and Lebanon clearly show a willingness to play by the rules, at least while in minority. More important, the process of inclusion promotes pragmatism and moderation; service in government and inclusionary politics then to reduce radicalism”[7] Still others may wonder what would motivate state governments to share its power with Islamist groups. The answer is simple: “Sharing power through inclusionary reform is means of preserving some power.”[8] Besides thriving on the weakness of the current states, Islamist groups boost their popularity with charitable actions. Islamist groups focus their attention on “charitable and education work, on trying to inculcate certain values and standards of behavior.”[9] The reason Islamist groups are able to carry out these activities is because they don’t, unlike the state governments, have any responsibility towards meeting societal obligations. If they are elected to office, the burden of state obligations might strain Islamists resources in the same way it has for the nationalist governments and may prohibit them from engaging in such these activities. It would then be apparent that engagement in these activities does not symbolize the efficacy of Islamism or the inefficacy of state governments, but rather is just a cause of systemic benefits enjoyed by Islamists. While these systemic changes will help undercut Islamism’s popularity by challenging its principles and activities, the true impact against Islamism will come from grass-root level cultural change. In 1960s, nationalist ideology reigned supreme in the Arab States. In 1960s, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt evoked the ideology of Pan-Arab nationalism. He fought the 1967 Arab-Israeli war under the nationalist ideological banner. However, the failure of such nationalistic endeavors created a demand for an alternative ideology. This is when Islamic politics exploded and by 1973 it had replaced nationalism. Unlike Nasser, his successor Anwar Sadat fought the 1973 Ramadan War under the banner of Islam, using it to unite all Arabs. Between 1967 and 1973, the Arab States had undergone a cultural change. Throughout history, ideologies have constantly replaced one another.[10] Islamism’s challenge with decrease as the ideology is replaced by another. What this new ideology is will be left up to time. Keeping up with modern society, this new ideology is likely to be globalization. Globalization means increased military, economical and political interdependence of a set of sovereign states, expanded flow of individuals among societies with socio-economic migration and travel, and expanded interdependence of expressive culture through enhanced global communication. Globalization, thus mediated by migration, commerce, communication technology and classification pushes nation-states to accept secularism, as it is the instrumental tool in surviving in a “global society.”[11] Where globalization (and, the resulting global integration) has been embraced, like in Dubai, Islamism has weakened. The systemic changes and political reform are short-term solutions to the problem of Islamism’s growing popularity. A change in ideology is the only long-term solution. Islamism is a force to reckon with in current politics. While judgment on the philosophy of Islamism is up to the public to decide, it cannot be denied that its existence has presented a challenge to the political stability of Arab governments. The short-term solution to the problem of Islamism’s growing popularity entails systemic changes that give moderate Islamist groups more direct participation in politics. The long-term solution can be achieved through gradual steps where Islamism is replaced with another ideology through natural grass-root level change. The path of finding a solution to curb the popularity of Islamism will be strewn with risks for both the current governments and the opposition. However, if the threat of reform invites apprehension, the risks of clinging on to total authoritarian rule driven to completely suppress Islamism are even more troubling. One can only hope that each side finds motivation to reach for the solution. Last but not the least, global integration achieved through the trade and commerce can provide a long-lasting alternative to Islamism. BibliographyAyoob M. “The Future of Political Islam: the Importance of External Variables,” International Affairs, 81:5 (2003), 951-960Dawisha, A. “Arab Nationalism and Islamism: Competitive Past, Uncertain Future,” International Studies Association (2001), p. 79-90 Fuller, G. “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs, 81:2 (March/April 2002), p. 47-60.Kramer, Martin and Graham Fuller, John Esposito, Daniel Pipes. Is Islamism a Threat? A Debate by Patrick Clawson. Washington, 2 September 1999. http://www.meforum.org/article/447. Meyer, John.”Globalization: Sources and Effects on National States and Societies,” International Sociology, 15:2 (June 2000), p. 233-248 Norton, A.R. “The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East,” Current History, (January 1995)
[1] Fuller, G. “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs, 81:2 (March/April 2002), p. 49.
[2] Ayoob M. “The Future of Political Islam: the Importance of External Variables,” International Affairs, 81:5 (2003), 956
[3] Norton, A.R. “The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East,” Current History, (January 1995)
[4] Kramer, Martin and Graham Fuller, John Esposito, Daniel Pipes. Is Islamism a Threat? A Debate by Patrick Clawson. Washington, 2 September 1999. http://www.meforum.org/article/447.
[5] Ayoob M. “The Future of Political Islam: the Importance of External Variables,” International Affairs, 81:5 (2003), 957
[6] Fuller, G. “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs, 81:2 (March/April 2002), p. 52
[7] Norton, A.R. “The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East,” Current History, (January 1995)
[8] Norton, A.R. “The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East,” Current History, (January 1995)
[9] Dawisha, A. “Arab Nationalism and Islamism: Competitive Past, Uncertain Future,” International Studies Association (2001), p. 79-90
[10] Norton, A.R. “The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East,” Current History, (January 1995)
[11] Meyer, John.”Globalization: Sources and Effects on National States and Societies,” International Sociology, 15:2 (June 2000), p. 233-248












