Anti-Americanism in Europe: Are differences in the Political Systems the Cause?

Pan-Europeanism is the new state of Europe, and this is hidden from no one. European countries have come together, economically and politically, to tilt the balance-of-power on their side through cooperation and collaboration. It cannot be denied that Pan-Europeanism is more than just a political union; it is also a cultural union. With this growing Pan-Europeanism, many notice the birth of strong Anti-Americanism. Political theorists such as Mark Leonard and T.R. Reid believe that differences between Europe and the US outweigh their similarities, and that these differences fuel a transatlantic rift, or in many cases, a growing European anti-Americanism. This thesis raises many questions: Is Europe bound by their similarities or do they stand united only to reject the US? What are these similarities and differences in the political systems? And to what extent are these political differences the cause of the growing anti-Americanism? In order to begin answering these questions, I will first profoundly evaluate the differences and the similarities between US and the European countries. Having done so, I will then move on to assess whether these differences are really the cause of the anti-Americanism, or is the rift caused by something more than just differences in political structure and philosophy.

In comparing the political systems of the US and the European countries it is best to start with the comparison of the constitutional arrangement of their governments. While both aim for a democracy, the European countries, such as Germany and Great Britain, in general embrace the Parliamentary Democracy, where as the US is a Presidential Democracy. Phillips Shively lists the some of the key aspects of a Parliamentary Democracy:

• “A parliament of representatives is elected by the citizens of the state […] the parliament is the only elected body in the state.
  
• “The executive power of the state is lodged with a cabinet of women and men who are selected by the parliament to conduct the affairs of the state.
  
• “The cabinet retains executive power only as long as it has the “confidence” of the parliament. That is, only as long as it can command a majority of the votes.
  
• “Just as the parliament holds the cabinet in jeopardy, the leader of the cabinet usually has the right to have the parliament disbanded, forcing a new election that will lead to a new distribution of power” (Shively 315).
  

Shively, then, goes on to list the key aspects of the Presidential system, such as the one following in the US:

• “Parties are often more loosely unified in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems. […] the president has little control over the careers and advancement of members of the legislature and cannot force unity on them. Even when the president’s party has a majority of the seats in the legislature, the president will usually not be able to control what happens in the legislature […]
  
• There is no guarantee that the party that holds the presidency will also control the legislature. The two parts of the government apparatus are elected independently […]” (Shively 335).
  

These are some very basic differences in constitutional arrangements. Germany and Great Britain use the Proportional Representation (PR) System in their Parliamentary democracies. . In PR system, the number of parliamentary seats won by each party is directly proportional to the votes cast in favor of it. Pippa Norris describes PR as follows, “PR electoral systems focus on the inclusion of all voices, emphasizing the need for bargaining and compromise within parliament, government, the policymaking process.” Unlike the voters, who vote strategically, in a First Past The Pole (FPTP)
system [as in the US], in which the party that is first to pass a threshold wins the majority, voters in PR system are able to vote for the party that they most relate to, even if it is a small party, because they know that their vote is not wasted. However great the difference between Europe and the US may seem because of these different approaches to democracy, it is important to note that France is a Presidential democracy which uses a fusion of the PR and the FPTP systems. The difference, therefore, between Germany and the US, for example, is only fractionally more than the difference between Germany and France.

Along with constitutional arrangements, it is also worth examining the labor market and the welfare system for the similarities and the differences between Europe and US. As far as the labor market goes, American labor force works much differently than the European. In his article in the New Yorker titled The Financial Page: No work and No Play, James Surowiecki states that when compared to the average American, the French work 28% fewer hours per person and the Germans 25%. Although this does result in more wealth in America, he writes, “In terms of productivity – that is, how much a worker produces in an hour – there’s little difference between the U.S., France, and Germany. But since more people work in America, and since they work so many more hours, Americans trade their productivity for more money, while Europeans trade it for more leisure” (Surowiecki). So what caused these differences between the countries? “European labor unions are far more powerful and European labor markets are far more tightly regulated than their American counterparts” (Surowiecki).

The differences are increased further when the interaction between labor markets and welfare system is evaluated. The US has what Robert Goodin (and his co-authors) call a Liberal Welfare regime. They state, “The liberal welfare regime is characterized by (1) liberal politics, (2) capitalist economies and (3) residualist social policies” (Goodin 40). This model calls for the state to be ‘neutral’ among all competition. The residualist social policies in a welfare system like the one in US are for the least advantaged of the society. In contrast, Germany and France have an extensive welfare system that reaches all aspects of European life including health care, pension system, family insurance system, education system, and the unemployment insurance. While it is true Germany and France differ from the US greatly in terms of the welfare system, not all European countries do: an example of this is Great Britain. “Historically, [the American] model arose in the course of the industrial revolution, and it found its fullest flowering in England with the New Poor Law of 1832 (Goodin 40). While it is true that the British model has continued to change and evolve, it is important to recognize the common ground between Great Britain and US.

Having, thus, analyzed the differences between European and American political systems, the question arises: The growth of anti-Americanism in Europe cannot be denied, but is the rift due to these political differences or is it caused by something else?

In The United States of Europe, T.R. Reid states, “What really annoys the Europeans is that this nation perceived to be ignorant of the rest of the world has the wealth and the power to dominate much of it. The French parliamentarian Noel Mamere [argued] that it is appropriate to be downright anti-American because of this combination of strength and stupidity” (Reid 19). The resentment towards the American wealth can be explained by the differences in the political system: More Americans work many more hours than Europeans; as a result the wealth they generate is considerably higher. Reid cites a survey that gives a baseline reading on French attitudes towards US that states that 50% of the French public see the US as a nation of violence, 48% see it as a nation that uses the death penalty and 45% believe that US is a nation of great social inequality (20). The ‘nation of violence,’ which can be explained by recent foreign policy such as the Iraq War, shows the effect of contemporary politics on the rift. Mark Leonard supports this in saying, “Between 11 September 2001 and June 2004, US military spending grew to match that of the whole of the rest of the world combined. […] It has damaged America’s standing in the world” (Leonard 122). Most interesting though is the comment made by 45% of the French public that the US is a nation of social inequality. This statistic strikes at the heart of the difference in the welfare system. The American liberal welfare model, unlike the European, is residualist. This does result in the inequality of wealth and the fact that the US government refuses to change this inequality is appalling to Europeans who pride themselves on the extensive social welfare programs.

While Leonard and Reid’s arguments prove that the differences in the politics of US and Europe lead to anti-Americanism, Josef Joffe, in his Überpower, states that there is a difference between policy anti-Americanism and the “Real Thing.” He writes, “to attribute American behavior to inbred imperialism (“look what they did to the Indians”), to American capitalism (“blood for oil”), or to religious bigotry (“they claim divine guidance”) transcends policy criticism. […] They denounce not the policy but the polity” (Joffe 73). Although Joffe does not disagree with Leonard and Reid, he believes that anti-Americanism is more than just a resentment towards policies or political structure, it is the denouncing of a culture.

It is true that America and Europe share many differences, and some similarities. And to a great extent, as Leonard and Reid assert, these differences lead to prejudiced views that cause Anti-Americanism in Europe. However, Anti-Americanism can and is, as Joffe asserts, caused by certain cultural perceptions and misconceptions. While both Europe and the US share a strong desire for democracy, they approach it in different ways, and these different ways, would perhaps, lead the European countries and the US to different destinations.

Works Cited

James Surowiecki. 2005. “No Work and No Play,” The New Yorker (November 28)

Josef Joffe. 2006. Überpower:The Imperial Temptation of America (New York: Norton)

Mark Leonard. 2005. Why Europe Will Run the 21^st Century (London: Fourth Estate)Phillips Shively. 2005. Power and Choice (Ninth Edition) (New York: McGraw Hill)

Pippa Norris. 2004. Electoral Engineering (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Robert Goodin et. Al 1999. The Real World of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

T. R. Reid. 2004. The United States of Europe (New York: Penguin)