Brainwave#2 – Islamism: A Solution to Islamism

            Dealing with Islamism has been a major problem in the Arab politics. Islamism has presented the strongest challenge to the authority, performance, and power of the Arab States causing political instability in the region and skepticism in the world (particularly, the West). Ignoring Islamism is not an option and suppressing it no longer feasible. While Islamist groups exist in all forms: radical or moderate, violent or non-violent, traditional or modernist, democratic or authoritarian, it is only the challenge presented by moderate Islamist groups that is in discussion here.[1] These mainstream moderate Islamist groups operate peacefully within national boundaries, and seek to influence the politics of their societies by working within the system.[2]             Before attempting to propose a solution, a brief explanation of the causes of the popularity of Islamism is necessary. Key historical events, such as the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Iranian Revolution and the Hostage crisis, created disdain for the nationalistic endeavors and a demand for Islamism as an alternative ideology.[3] While these events explain the growth of Islamism, the root cause of its inception is the failing and illegitimate authoritarian rule in various Arab states. Where the authoritarian state delivers, protest is rare. But for many reasons, that have nothing to do with Islamism, such as falling oil prices, rapidly expanding populations that inhibit economic growth and unwillingness to open up markets, the authoritarian regimes have ceased to be efficient. [4] Paradoxically, by eliminating secular opposition movements and parties, these regimes created a political and intellectual space that Islamism quickly occupied. Even the most repressive Arab state cannot control opposition expressed through the religious idiom.[5] Due to these reasons, Islamism’s influence rose in Arab politics and continues challenge the authority of the Arab States, causing political instability through opposition movements.            An analysis of the causes behind Islamism’s popularity provides the foundation through which Arab states can meet the challenge of Islamism. Islamism thrives on the weakness and inability of the current governments. Islamist groups particularly engage in activities such as community service to provide the people what they don’t get from the governments and therefore, appear as a better option compared to nationalist governments. In order to counter its challenge, Arab states will have to take measure that will undercut the popularity of Islamist groups and will win some goodwill of the public. Countering the demand of Islamist groups and ideology will require certain systemic changes and some grass-root level cultural changes.             The first step in undercutting the popular support of Islamist groups through system reform is testing their adherence to the principles they advocate. The only way this is possible is if moderate Islamist groups are allowed to directly participate in politics. The suppression of opposition parties and movements created the vacuum, which Islamism has moved into. In the past, three Islamic state models – Iran, Sudan, and Taliban’s Afghanistan – have all failed dramatically, revealing the inability of Islamists to run effective and moderate governments. [6]  Just like Islamism thrives on the weakness of the state governments, state governments would benefit if the weakness of Islamism as a political alternative is exposed, thus reducing the challenge it presents to its authority. Giving political voice to Islamist groups might seem like a risky endeavor, however, it seems less so when the effect that election campaigns have on Islamist groups is taken into account.             The decision to participate in elections divides Islamist groups into radicals and moderates. Radical Islamists defy state-dominated elections and believe them to be meaningless and manipulated. Moderates, who consistently bring a majority with them, push for a gradualist approach and “seize on the legitimacy” derived from competition. Given this, the state’s decision to exclude Islamists from election, ironically, ends up solidifying the radical Islamist movements and weakening the beneficial moderate ones. For those who believe that once in office, Islamists would adopt radical postures on Islamic issues (possibly to embarrass the government), history has provided examples that puts such claims to rest. “The examples in Jordon, Kuwait, and Lebanon clearly show a willingness to play by the rules, at least while in minority. More important, the process of inclusion promotes pragmatism and moderation; service in government and inclusionary politics then to reduce radicalism”[7] Still others may wonder what would motivate state governments to share its power with Islamist groups. The answer is simple: “Sharing power through inclusionary reform is means of preserving some power.”[8]            Besides thriving on the weakness of the current states, Islamist groups boost their popularity with charitable actions. Islamist groups focus their attention on “charitable and education work, on trying to inculcate certain values and standards of behavior.”[9] The reason Islamist groups are able to carry out these activities is because they don’t, unlike the state governments, have any responsibility towards meeting societal obligations. If they are elected to office, the burden of state obligations might strain Islamists resources in the same way it has for the nationalist governments and may prohibit them from engaging in such these activities. It would then be apparent that engagement in these activities does not symbolize the efficacy of Islamism or the inefficacy of state governments, but rather is just a cause of systemic benefits enjoyed by Islamists.             While these systemic changes will help undercut Islamism’s popularity by challenging its principles and activities, the true impact against Islamism will come from grass-root level cultural change. In 1960s, nationalist ideology reigned supreme in the Arab States. In 1960s, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt evoked the ideology of Pan-Arab nationalism. He fought the 1967 Arab-Israeli war under the nationalist ideological banner. However, the failure of such nationalistic endeavors created a demand for an alternative ideology. This is when Islamic politics exploded and by 1973 it had replaced nationalism. Unlike Nasser, his successor Anwar Sadat fought the 1973 Ramadan War under the banner of Islam, using it to unite all Arabs. Between 1967 and 1973, the Arab States had undergone a cultural change. Throughout history, ideologies have constantly replaced one another.[10] Islamism’s challenge with decrease as the ideology is replaced by another. What this new ideology is will be left up to time. Keeping up with modern society, this new ideology is likely to be globalization. Globalization means increased military, economical and political interdependence of a set of sovereign states, expanded flow of individuals among societies with socio-economic migration and travel, and expanded interdependence of expressive culture through enhanced global communication. Globalization, thus mediated by migration, commerce, communication technology and classification pushes nation-states to accept secularism, as it is the instrumental tool in surviving in a “global society.”[11] Where globalization (and, the resulting global integration) has been embraced, like in Dubai, Islamism has weakened. The systemic changes and political reform are short-term solutions to the problem of Islamism’s growing popularity. A change in ideology is the only long-term solution.             Islamism is a force to reckon with in current politics. While judgment on the philosophy of Islamism is up to the public to decide, it cannot be denied that its existence has presented a challenge to the political stability of Arab governments. The short-term solution to the problem of Islamism’s growing popularity entails systemic changes that give moderate Islamist groups more direct participation in politics. The long-term solution can be achieved through gradual steps where Islamism is replaced with another ideology through natural grass-root level change. The path of finding a solution to curb the popularity of Islamism will be strewn with risks for both the current governments and the opposition. However, if the threat of reform invites apprehension, the risks of clinging on to total authoritarian rule driven to completely suppress Islamism are even more troubling. One can only hope that each side finds motivation to reach for the solution. Last but not the least, global integration achieved through the trade and commerce can provide a long-lasting alternative to Islamism.    BibliographyAyoob M. “The Future of Political Islam: the Importance of External Variables,” International Affairs, 81:5 (2003), 951-960Dawisha, A. “Arab Nationalism and Islamism: Competitive Past, Uncertain Future,” International Studies Association (2001), p. 79-90 Fuller, G. “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs, 81:2 (March/April 2002), p. 47-60.Kramer, Martin and Graham Fuller, John Esposito, Daniel Pipes. Is Islamism a Threat? A Debate by Patrick Clawson. Washington, 2 September 1999. http://www.meforum.org/article/447.  Meyer, John.”Globalization: Sources and Effects on National States and Societies,” International Sociology, 15:2 (June 2000), p. 233-248 Norton, A.R. “The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East,” Current History, (January 1995)

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[1] Fuller, G. “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs, 81:2 (March/April 2002), p. 49.

[2] Ayoob M. “The Future of Political Islam: the Importance of External Variables,” International Affairs, 81:5 (2003), 956

[3] Norton, A.R. “The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East,” Current History, (January 1995)

 

[4] Kramer, Martin and Graham Fuller, John Esposito, Daniel Pipes. Is Islamism a Threat? A Debate by Patrick Clawson. Washington, 2 September 1999. http://www.meforum.org/article/447.

[5] Ayoob M. “The Future of Political Islam: the Importance of External Variables,” International Affairs, 81:5 (2003), 957

 

[6] Fuller, G. “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs, 81:2 (March/April 2002), p. 52

[7] Norton, A.R. “The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East,” Current History, (January 1995)

[8] Norton, A.R. “The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East,” Current History, (January 1995)

[9] Dawisha, A. “Arab Nationalism and Islamism: Competitive Past, Uncertain Future,” International Studies Association (2001), p. 79-90

[10] Norton, A.R. “The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East,” Current History, (January 1995)

 

[11] Meyer, John.”Globalization: Sources and Effects on National States and Societies,” International Sociology, 15:2 (June 2000), p. 233-248 

Brainwave#1 – Islamism: A Challenge to the Authority of Arab States

Islamism is the most powerful political ideology in the Arab States. Multiple forms of Islamism are spreading across Middle East: radical or moderate, violent or non-violent, traditional or modernist, democratic or authoritarian.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[1]<!–[endif]–> There is no denying that this ideology has gained popular support and that it has been the biggest opposition to the many nationalist governments in the region. Opposition presented by Islamist groups has challenged the authority, performance, and power of the Arab States causing political instability in the region and skepticism in the world (particularly, the West). Ignoring Islamism is no longer an option and suppressing it no longer feasible. Dealing with Islamism has been a major problem in the politics of Arab world. The diverse, and often contradictory, goals and workings of Islamist groups prevent a clear understanding of the ideology and make a simple solution impossible.

Islamism is often associated with militant organizations such as Al-Qaeda. It is important to note that dealing with these militant organizations is also a challenge for the Arab States, it is mainly the challenge presented by moderate Islamist groups that is in discussion here. Even though violent Islamist movements and organizations “loom large in the West’s imagination as a result of their dramatic acts of terror [they] are marginal to the large majority of Islamist movements and ineffective as far as the day-to-day political struggles within Muslim countries are concerned. Most mainstream Islamist movements operate peacefully within national boundaries, and attempt to influence and transform their societies and polities largely though constitutional means even when the constitutional and political cards are stacked against them.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[2]<!–[endif]–> The complexness surrounding Islamism is excellently manifested in the debate surrounding its meaning.

Although many have attempted to define as been Islamism – or political Islam, few have agreed on one particular definition. The Middle East Quarterly, a leading scholarly journal on the politics of the region, hosted a debate in order to gain an understanding of Islamism. The deliberation included four renowned political scientists of Arab states: Martin Kramer, Graham Fuller, John Esposito, and Daniel Pipes. When asked to define Islamism, the four came up with four different definitions. Graham Fuller’s definition offers a concise explanation of what is generally believed to be Islamism. According to him, “Islamism is largely synonymous with political Islam – an effort to draw out meaning out of Islam applicable to problems of contemporary governance, society, and politics.” Esposito adds to this definition by stressing that the ideology supports “political and social activism,” <!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[3]<!–[endif]–> Yet another definition is offered by Mohammed Ayoob in his article in International Affairs. He describes Islamism as “a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[4]<!–[endif]–> No matter which definition is accepted as optimal, the thing that is certain is that Islamist groups have political goals and their popularity challenges the authoritarian nationalist governments.

In order to understand the challenge presented by Islamism in Arab States it is important to understand the causes that foster its growth and popular support. The modern-day introduction of Islam in political life of Arab States has its roots in various critical historical events. In 1960s, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt evoked the ideology of Pan-Arab nationalism. He fought the 1967 Arab-Israeli war under the nationalist ideological banner. However, the failure of such nationalistic endeavors created a demand for an alternative ideology. This is when Islamic politics exploded. Unlike Nasser, his successor Anwar Sadat fought the 1973 Ramadan War under the banner of Islam, using it to unite all Arabs. In Libya, Mu’ammar Qaddafi used Islamic symbols to legitimize his populist rule, adding to the power of Islamism. Of all the regional developments in the 1970s, the two most important events that boasted the popularity for Islamism were the Iranian Revolution and the Hostage Crisis. Explaining the role of Islam in the 1979 Iranian revolution, Augustus Richard Norton writes: “By mid-1978, sensing the resonance of Islamic symbolism, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi decreed the adoption of the traditional Persian solar calendar and took other superficial steps intended to “Islamicize” his regime. We all know how the story ended.” The success of Islamism in form of the Iranian revolution added to its popularity.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[5]<!–[endif]–> The successful use of Islam as a political tool in these historical events put Islamism at the center of Arab politics, and secured its place as a viable opponent to the Arab states.

The question that is still left unanswered is why these Arab leaders were able to use Islam so successfully in political realm. What conditions created popular support for Islamism? While the above mentioned historical events explain the growth of Islamism, it is important to dig a little deeper to find the root cause of its inception. Certain political conditions provide Islamist groups to assert their credentials and gain support by criticizing the incompetence and corruption of existing regimes. Fuller discusses the importance of state politics with the assertion that “most regimes see almost any form of political Islam as a threat,” and dealing with these regimes presents a major problem in the Arab States. He goes on to say, Islamism “embodies a major challenge to their unpopular, failing, and illegitimate presidents-for-life or isolated monarchs [as in the case of Iran prior to Iranian Revolution]. How the regime responds to the phenomenon often plays a major role in determining how the local Islamist movement develops.” He provides a list of questions such as the state of social and economic conditions, the degree of violence and repression in the political culture, the permission of legitimate election and free political discussion that determine how Islamists operate in a particular country. He adds that in some “local political scene […] Islamists are routinely suppressed, jailed, tortured, and executed. Such circumstances encourage the emergence of secret, conspiratorial and often armed groups rather than liberal ones.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[6]<!–[endif]–> Fuller’s arguments invariably lead to the notion that Authoritarian regimes are the cause of Islamism’s growing support.

During the Middle East Quarterly debate, Martin Kramer elaborates of Fuller’s point about authoritarianism. He states:

 

“I wouldn’t so much speak of the authoritarian state as a paternalistic state. A paternalistic state is part of the historical and cultural legacy of the region. When the paternalistic state delivers, protest is rare; an efficient paternalistic state can last, as the Ottoman Empire did, for hundreds of years. Yet, for many reasons having nothing to do with Islamism, the paternalistic state has faltered in recent years. Falling oil prices are one reason; rapidly expanding populations, which are a drag on economic growth, another. The unwillingness to open markets, largely because of old nationalist dogmas, has hurt growth, as has aping the Soviet model of development. These elements have created a state that has ceased to be efficient enough to satisfy many of its beneficiaries, and they have responded by turning against it. Islamism is a leading expression of that discontent.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[7]<!–[endif]–>

Kramer’s argument depicts how closed political systems and authoritarian regimes are highly conducive to growth in the popularity of Islamist political formation an ideology. Dawisha provides supports Kramer by arguing that Islamist groups are “focused on charitable and education work, on trying to inculcate certain values and standards of behavior.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[8]<!–[endif]–> Such activities of the Islamist groups gain them popular support while creating disdain and challenges for the regimes. While this explanation for Islamism’s growth might seem to be unquestionably accurate, it is important to note that there is much debate about this as well. During the debate, Daniel Pipes challenged Kramer saying:

“I wonder. Do all these reasons you just gave apply to the United States? Clearly not – and yet Islamists dominate American Muslim institutions, publications, and mosques. […] I can find you plenty of cases of dictators without much Islamism, or democracies with Islamism. I can also find you poor states without it, rich states with it.” <!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[9]<!–[endif]–>

While Pipes does not back up his claims with any particular examples, his comment is enough to show that even though the domestic policies authoritarian regimes can be an important cause, it cannot be the only one. The political systems argument holds even more merit however, when party politics in Arab States is taken into account. Ayoob writes, “Paradoxically, these very regimes, by successfully eliminating secular opposition movements and parties and banishing ‘normal’ politics, have created the political and intellectual space into which the Islamists have moved. This is because not even the most efficient repressive state can fully suppress opposition expressed through the religious idiom.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[10]<!–[endif]–>

In addition to the historical and systematical causes for the popularity of Islamism, the international power structure also increases support for Islamist organizations. Islamist groups assert that “if Muslims are able to recreate a true and pure Islamic society, they will be able to regain their former glory – or at least compete with the West [the implementer of direct and indirect domination, both during the colonial era and the post-cold war era] on a basis of equality. Their slogan ‘Islam is the solution’ emanates from these interlocking arguments.” Moreover, major international powers and their policies are perceived by Arabs as being primarily responsible for keeping them in the sad plight they are in today. Going back to the earlier point, this Islamist prescription gains popular support because nationalist governments were unable to “provide dignity, freedom, power or wealth to most Muslims around the world” and have not gained any significant standing in international politics.

The causes of the popularity of Islamism are varied yet interconnected. While inception of Islamism can be explained primarily explained by the effect of regional-state-level politics, the international standing of the Arab world and critical historical events has had a tremendous impact on its growth. Islamism is a growing problem in the Arab world because few states have been able to counter the powerful challenge it presents to the authority of state governments. Dealing with Islamist groups, and finding a solution that accommodates them in the political life of Arab states is the overarching phenomenon that will determine the region domestic politics and its international footing. It is the major problem in the Arab States that needs to be addressed in a manner that is pragmatic and effective.

 

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<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[1]<!–[endif]–> Fuller, G. (2002, March/April). The Future of Political Islam. Foreign Affairs , 81 (2), pp.49

[2]<!–[endif]–> Ayoob, M. (2005). The Future of Political Islam: the Importance of External Variables. International Affairs , 951-961.

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[3]<!–[endif]–> Is Islamism a Threat? (1999, December). Middle East Quarterly .

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[4]<!–[endif]–> Ayoob, M. (2005). The Future of Political Islam: the Importance of External Variables. International Affairs , 952..

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[5]<!–[endif]–> Norton, A. R. (1995, January). The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East. Current History .

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[6]<!–[endif]–> Fuller, G. (2002, March/April). The Future of Political Islam. Foreign Affairs , 81 (2), pp. 48-60.

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[7]<!–[endif]–> Is Islamism a Threat? (1999, December). Middle East Quarterly .

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[8]<!–[endif]–> Dawisha, A. (2001). Arab Nationalism and Islamism: Competitive Past, Uncertain Future. international Studies Association , 79-90.

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[9]<!–[endif]–>Is Islamism a Threat? (1999, December). Middle East Quarterly .

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[10]<!–[endif]–>Ayoob, M. (2005). The Future of Political Islam: the Importance of External Variables. International Affairs , 951-961.